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3Doing Business in Indonesia: enforcement of contracts in the general courts 
and the creation of a specialised commercial court for intellectual property and 
bankruptcy cases
By Christoph Antons2
Conventional theory suggests that the reliable enforcement of contracts is a basic 
precondition for businesses. Seen in this light, the situation in Indonesia, and 
indeed in much of East and Southeast Asia, seems paradoxical. Countries have 
achieved persistently high growth rates using often archaic and outdated legal 
systems. However, not only is the Indonesian system outdated, it is also costly 
and cumbersome. According to the World Bank Doing Business Report of 2006 it 
takes on average 34 days and 570 days to enforce a contract in Indonesia. The 
costs for the procedure amount to 126.5% of the actual debt. This leads to a 
ranking of 145 in the ‘Enforcing Contracts’ category out of 155 countries, the 
worst among Indonesia’s rankings in the report and still significantly lower than 
the country’s ranking at 115 for the overall ease of doing business.
This paper will examine the reasons for the neglect of much of private and 
commercial law and accompanying procedural laws in Indonesia. It will then 
examine how businesses operate under these conditions and how, in spite of 
these difficult circumstances, contracts continue to be used. After a short 
discussion of the effects of the Asian Crisis, it will look at most recent reform 
efforts, in particular with the creation of a Commercial Court responsible for 
bankruptcy and intellectual property cases only. An initial assessment of the 
performance of this court will be attempted. The paper concludes with some final 
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4remarks on the legal heritage theory advocated in the Doing Business report of 
2004 and on the relationship between business law regulation, economic 
efficiency, development policies and foreign investment as exemplified by 
intellectual property laws.
The historical background of commercial law and procedural law in Indonesia
While the history of European derived law in Indonesia dates back to the arrival 
of first Portuguese and then Dutch colonizers in the archipelago, it was not until 
the dissolution of the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) in 1800 and the French 
interregnum in the Netherlands that the colonial “state” of the Netherlands East 
Indies was formed. Especially after the revolutionary year of 1848 in Europe, 
traders and the upcoming bourgeoisie began to demand economic liberalization 
of the colony.3 The result was a wave of mainly private and commercial laws for 
the Netherlands East Indies enacted in or around the year 1848, including the 
Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek), the Commercial Code (Wetboek van Koophandel) 
and two different procedural codes for Europeans on the one hand (Reglement of 
de Regstvordering voor het Hoog Geregtshof en de Raden van Justitie) and for the 
indigenous population on the other hand (Reglement op de administratie der policie, 
mitsgaders op de burgerlijke Regstpleging em strafvordering voor inlanders en daarmede 
gelijkgestelde personen). The policy of the colonial government to keep the various 
groups of populations legally apart meant that the vast majority of Indonesians 
had little or nothing to do with the European derived part of the legal system. 
Dutch derived law applied in general only to Europeans and to citizens of non-
European countries with similar legal systems, such as US Americans or (from 
the end of the 19th century onwards) the Japanese. Dutch derived commercial law 
applied to the population group of the so-called “Foreign Orientals” (Vreemde 
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5Oosterlingen), traders of mainly Chinese, Indian or Arab descent, who had often 
lived in the colony for generations and were given privileged positions in trade 
by the Dutch, but otherwise to some extent restricted in their opportunities to 
mingle with other population groups. After the foundation of the Republic of 
China, the Chinese became subjected to Dutch law with only few exceptions. 
Ethnic Indonesians, however, remained under the principles of Islamic law 
and/or traditional customary law (adat). Towards the end of the colonial period, 
this developed into a complicated conflict of law system called the intergentiel 
recht (nowadays translated into Indonesian as hukum antargolongan (intergroup 
law)), that foresaw for transactions between members of different population 
groups and also for the complete change from one group to another via 
“equalization” (gelijkstelling) with the Europeans or assimilation with the 
indigenous population (inlanders).4 Therefore, the Dutch left a legal system 
behind that distinguished sharply between Europeans and people from similar 
legal systems, Foreign Orientals and indigenous Indonesians on racial and 
religious grounds. Although appeals would go to the colonial higher courts, 
different courts were administering law to these various groups and different 
procedural laws applied.
First cracks in the system appeared with the Japanese occupation during World 
War II, when the Japanese applied anti-European and anti-Dutch policies leading 
to some unification of the court system and procedural laws and to the 
abolishment of the dominant legal status of the Europeans.5 Importantly, the 
revised procedural laws for Indonesians (Herziene Indische Reglement, valid on 
Java and Madura, and the Rechtsreglement Buitengewesten for the outer islands) 
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6became now the procedural law for all inhabitants of the archipelago.6 When the 
Republic of Indonesia came into being in 1945, Article II of the Transitional 
Provisions of the new Constitution and Government Decree No. 2 of 1945 
provided for the continuing relevance of the colonial laws and institutions until 
their replacement in accordance with the new constitution7.
Commercial law reform during the ‘New Order’ years and during ‘Reformasi’ 
Thus, it came that Dutch civil, commercial and procedural law survived the 
transition to independence. It also survived the reign of Indonesia’s first 
President Sukarno (in Indonesia referred to as the ‘Old Order’ (Orde Lama)) 
largely unharmed, in spite of revolutionary rhetoric for its replacement and the 
deletion of eight articles of the Civil Code.8 When the ‘New Order” (Orde Baru) of 
General Suharto seized power in 1965, there were initial hopes for a revision of 
some of the excesses of the late Sukarno years in the legal field, such as the 
excessive use of administrative and presidential decrees. However, those hoping 
for a more extensive role of Dutch derived state law and a general reform of the 
increasingly outdated legislation were soon disappointed. The authoritarian 
nature of the Suharto regime and the strong role of the military in it meant that 
liberal ideas of the rule of law, parliamentarian democracy and human rights had 
little prospects. However, throughout its reign and in contrast to the Sukarno 
years, the ‘New Order’ and the economic technocrats in the National 
Development Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional –
BAPPENAS) remained business oriented and foreign investor friendly. The 
influence of the technocrats grew in particular after a period of economic 
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7nationalist policies based on the high prices for oil and gas came to an end in the 
mid-1980s and Indonesia shifted to an export oriented approach that made the 
attraction of foreign investment even more important. The late 1980s and the 
final years of the Suharto government in the 1990s thus saw a period of reform 
for Indonesian business law, with a completely new set of intellectual property 
laws, the replacement of a part of the old Dutch Commercial Code with a new 
Company Law and the revision of the Bankruptcy Law and introduction of a 
specialised Commercial Court. Interim President Habibie continued these 
reforms after the end of Suharto’s reign in 1998 with a revised banking law, a 
new law on the Central Bank, a law on arbitration and alternative dispute 
resolution, an anti-monopoly law and a consumer protection law. Commercial 
law reform continued under the subsequent Presidents Abdurahman Wahid, 
Megawati Sukarnoputri and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, although there was 
also a strong focus on constitutional reform9 and on administrative 
decentralization. The entire period after the end of the Suharto regime has been 
described as one of ‘reformation’ (reformasi).
Reform of the court system and of procedural laws
The strong emphasis on substantive commercial law reform has, however, not 
been accompanied by a thorough reform of the civil procedural codes. The 
international focus on human rights has brought a certain attention for criminal 
law procedures and the Indonesian Criminal Procedural Code was completely 
revised in 1981.10 Civil Procedural law has not attracted a similar interest and 61 
years after independence, the Herziene Indonesisch Reglement (as it became known 
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8after independence) or HIR and the Rechtsreglement Buitengewesten or Rbg. still 
apply. They are heavily criticized by Indonesian lawyers as outdated, especially 
because of their paternalistic colonial character of providing procedures for the 
‘simple needs’ in commercial matters of the indigenous population in a largely 
agrarian society during colonial times. Rather than opting for a comprehensive 
reform of the civil procedural codes, Indonesia has enacted a large number of 
laws and decrees dealing with the structure and the organization of courts and 
increasingly providing specialized provisions for specialized courts. The more 
important general ones are the Law regarding Powers in Judicial Affairs of 2004 
and the Law on General Judicature of 1986 as revised in 2004. These laws are 
largely concerned with the administration of the courts and the appointment of 
judges, although they cover a few procedural matters as well for both the civil 
and criminal jurisdiction of the courts. These revisions and the laws mentioned 
subsequently became also necessary with the third amendment of the Indonesian 
Constitution in 2001, which introduced among other things the new 
Constitutional Court and a Judicial Commission responsible for the appointment 
and supervision of judges and it provided that “the judicial power shall be 
independent and shall possess the power to organize the judicature in order to 
enforce law and justice.” (Art. 24(1) of the Constitution of 1945). This was a long 
awaited step to remove the courts from the influence of the Ministry of Justice, 
which under the ‘New Order’ had increasingly managed the personal and 
financial matters of the courts and thereby ensured the political dependence of 
the judges.11 Low payment of judges, at least at the lower courts, as civil servants, 
also opened the door to corruption. According to one study, by 1992 no less than 
666 general court judges or 30% of the entire judiciary hade been subjected to 
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9disciplinary action for corruption. Estimates by insiders around the same time 
even put the number of corrupt judges at approximately 50%.12
Of the more specialized laws regarding the judiciary, the Law on the Supreme 
Court of 1985 was also revised in 2004 and a further law formed the Indonesian 
Judicial Commission (Komisi Yudisial) as a supervisory agency of the judiciary. 
Further, a large number of specialized courts have been founded, mostly under 
special legislation outlining their structure, functions and procedural rules, but 
occasionally also as part of substantive legislation. Examples for the former 
group are the Law on the Children’s Court of 1997, the Law on the Human 
Rights Court of 2000, the Law about the Settlement of Industrial Relations 
Disputes of 2004, the Law on the Taxation Court of 2002, the Law on the 
Religious Courts of 1989, the Law on the Administrative Courts of 1986 and the 
Law on the Constitutional Court of 2003. Provisions on specialised courts as part 
of substantive laws can be found for example in the Law on Fisheries of 2004, in 
the Shipping Law of 1992, in the Autonomy Law for the Special Province of Aceh 
of 2001 and in the Revised Bankruptcy Law and the various new intellectual 
property laws for the Commercial Court. The Commercial Court will be analysed 
in greater detail below.
Commercial contracts under the current system
Indonesian law does not distinguish between commercial contracts and other 
forms of contracts. The old Dutch Civil Code remains, therefore, relevant for 
commercial contract law. Equally, since commercial contract law is not among 
the areas covered by one of the new special courts with their specialized 
procedural provisions, the general procedural codes remain relevant, in 
particular the Herziene Indonesisch Reglement (HIR) and the Rechtsreglement 
                                                
12 Ibid., pp. 412-417
10
Buitengewesten (Rbg.). While it is too early to judge the effects of the most recent 
reforms of the court structure, in the past, the jurisdiction of the general courts 
tended to be affected by the following issues:
1. While the main appeal procedure (kasasi) has been inherited via the Dutch 
system from the French cassation, the Supreme Court has increasingly 
broadened the grounds for what is reviewable to the point of largely 
ignoring the distinction between fact and law-specific questions.13 A 
review of trade mark cases reveals, however, that it is hard to find any 
consistency in this matter.14 One of the arguments seems to be that the 
poor quality of district court judgments often requires a full review of the 
case.15
2. The increase in the number of appeals has been accompanied by a policy 
to discourage provisional enforcement, up to the point that this policy was 
expressly prescribed by a Supreme Court Circular Letter in 1978.16 The 
effect has been that an appeal effectively stays the execution of the 
judgment17 and that the appeal became a delaying tactic of the 
defendant.18   
3. Appeal decisions can be subjected to a further special review (peninjauan 
kembali) by the Supreme Court. Of the various reasons for the further 
review outlined in Article 67 of the Law on the Supreme Court, the more 
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important ones are the subsequent identification of false evidence, the 
emergence of new evidence or clear errors by the judges deciding the case 
in earlier instances. Although Article 66(2) of the Law on the Supreme 
Court clearly states that the procedure does not effect the execution of the 
judgment, this is in fact the case because of hierarchical considerations of 
the judges in the lower courts. Thereby, the special review has again 
become a useful instrument for delaying tactics by the defendant, so much 
so that one Supreme Court Judge estimated that among one thousand 
further review applications, there was on average only one well-founded 
one.19
4. At its discretion, the Supreme Court has often decided to stay the 
enforcement of its own decision, for example in cases of overriding public 
interest and sometimes for an indefinite length of time.20 The incidences, 
which trigger such a stay of execution, are difficult to predict. Equally, 
business people in Indonesia are well aware that obtaining a court 
decision in their favour does not yet guarantee payment and that the 
enforcement of the judgment is a further step.
5. While the recent court reforms are encouraging, claims about corruption 
are still frequently being made in the media. In the past, the many steps to 
enforcement of a judgment meant that litigation was costly and only a 
matter of last resort.21 The government has now taken various matters to 
confront and to penalise corruption, but newspaper reports indicate that 
the situation will certainly not change from one day to another. In fact, 
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there are also claims that the currently ongoing process of tax and 
financial and administrative decentralization empowering local districts 
has made matters worse.
In view of the difficulties outlined above, business people in Indonesia continue 
to “bargain in the shadow of the law”. The threat of litigation is effective in 
bringing people to the bargaining table, not so much because they are afraid that 
the truth will emerge in efficient legal proceedings, but because litigation can be 
a costly nightmare, especially for equally strong parties which both have long 
pockets.
In spite of the persistent problems, it would be wrong to think, however, that 
nothing has changed since the onset of reformation. But those changes that can 
be perceived at present have yet less to do with legal reforms than with a reform 
of the corporate environment. Most importantly, the Suharto period public sector 
‘franchise’ system, as Ross McLeod has called it22, has been dismantled to some 
extent and is less influential. A popular mock term used during the ‘New Order’ 
for business ventures involving both army or political backing and Chinese 
Indonesian businessmen was that of the ‘Ali Baba firm’. ‘Ali’ referred here to 
politically connected Indonesians, often from the ranks of the army or Suharto’s 
inner circle, who would provide the political patronage for the venture and 
ensure the smooth acquisition of licences, preferential credit allocation etc. 
‘Baba’, a term for a locally born Chinese, referred to Chinese-Indonesian business 
people, who brought the capital, skills and international trading networks to the 
venture.23 Given that these firms had both long pockets and were politically 
extremely well connected, commercial disputes with them were largely pointless. 
Accordingly, the security provided by contracts was limited. Relationships to the 
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powerful were much more important than carefully drafted agreements that 
could not be enforced. 
One of the most important changes since ‘reformasi’ is that the role of army or 
politically backed businesses has been reduced. It seems that there is a variety of 
factors behind this phenomenon, including a relatively more transparent 
environment because of improved legal and democratic institutions and 
intensive scrutiny by a now very free and outspoken media and by opposition 
parties as well as an improved position of foreign ownership leading to a greater 
choice of partners, in particular for small and medium sized enterprises. As a 
result, the Indonesian corporate landscape has become much more diverse than 
during the ‘New Order’. For commercial contracting, this means that more often 
than in the past companies of roughly equal strength will be dealing with each 
other. For these businesses, contracts are important to provide the fundamentals 
for their relationship and as a constant reference point for their operations. As a 
result, the role of commercial contracts between equal partners at various levels 
of the economy is becoming more important than during the Suharto years. This 
is equally reflected in a growing importance of commercial lawyers, which in 
turn has triggered a rising interest in legal studies and a rising number of 
enrolments in law schools. Law is increasingly being perceived as a potentially 
lucrative business. 
Of course, this increased ‘bargaining in the shadow of the law’ between roughly 
equal partners does not yet help in situations, where the relationship is grossly 
unequal. If there is a failure of relationship between roughly equal partners, the 
mere threat of litigation will be sufficient to bring the parties to the negotiation 
table, where the agreement will be reviewed and, if necessary, amended, for 
example by adding new terms of payment or agreeing to different forms of 
delivery or performance of the contract. In a grossly unequal relationship, this 
14
mechanism will fail and there is no incentive for the more powerful party to 
renegotiate. Instead, the weaker party can be simply overpowered and be 
presented with contractual terms on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.
Alternative dispute resolution
A further aspect of law reform, which may have some bearing on these matters, 
is the greater encouragement of commercial arbitration and alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) mechanisms since the late 1990s. The most important general 
legislation in this field is the Law on Arbitration and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution of 1999. For foreign arbitral awards in the field of commercial law, the 
law prescribes that the award must be recognized in Indonesia and that an 
exequatur must be obtained from the Head of the District Court of Central 
Jakarta that the award is enforceable. The main reason for not recognizing 
foreign arbitral awards is conflict with public order or policy. As one 
commentator has pointed out: “Determining whether something is or is not 
contrary to public policy is, therefore, a matter for the court’s discretion and it 
will be decided on a case by case basis. Recognition of a foreign arbitral award 
will thus depend on how the Indonesian court views each application.” As a 
result, the same commentator points out that “enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards in Indonesia has been successful only in cases where the losing parties 
did not actively resist the enforcement of the awards”24 and he concludes that “in 
the absence of any clear criteria of what considerations constitute public policy, 
the enforceability of foreign arbitral awards remains uncertain in Indonesia”25. 
National arbitration awards equally should not conflict with good morals and 
public policy.26 But even where arbitration awards are recognized, the 
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26 Ibid., p. 31
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enforcement follows then again the procedures of the general Civil Procedural 
Law (Art. 69(3)) with some of the associated problems that have been identified 
above.27
Apart from the general law on arbitration and alternative dispute resolution, 
there are various special mediation bodies and provisions for dispute resolution, 
such as in the field of taxes, unfair competition, industrial relations, consumer 
protection and environmental protection.28 Alternative dispute resolution is also 
now encouraged in almost all intellectual property laws after the complete 
reform of the intellectual property legislation between 2000 and 2002. The Act for 
the Protection of Plant Varieties of 2000 is the only exception to this, as it does 
not mention alternative dispute mechanisms.
The Commercial Court
The foundation of Indonesia’s first Commercial Court (Pengadilan Niaga) in 1998 
was not a carefully planned and coordinated act of court reform, but an 
emergency measure in the wake of the Asian Crisis. It came after intensive 
negotiations between IMF advisers in Jakarta and the Indonesian government, 
when it was realized that the ordinary courts were unable to deal with the rapid 
rise of corporate insolvencies on the basis of the colonial Faillissements 
Verordening.29 The emergency character of the changes can be seen from the legal 
form that was chosen to implement it. The changes to the bankruptcy legislation 
were implemented as a ‘Government Regulation in lieu of Law’ (Peraturan 
Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang or PERPU). According to Article 22(1) and 
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(2) of the Indonesian Constitution, such government regulations in lieu of law are 
possible in cases of extreme urgency, but must be approved by the Indonesian 
Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR) at its next session. In this case, 
PERPU No. 1 of 1998 was ratified by the DPR in July 1998 and signed into law by 
President Habibie in September 1998.30 In 2004, this law was replaced by a 
completely revised Bankruptcy Law.31
The provisions about the Commercial Court were originally to be found in 
Chapter 3 of the Revised Bankruptcy Code and they are now included in Chapter 
V of the new Bankruptcy law. The first Commercial Court was formed at the 
District Court of Central Jakarta, but the President by decision could open further 
Commercial Courts in line with needs and resources. This happened as early as 
1999, when four further Commercial Courts in the cities of Surabaya, Medan, 
Semarang and Ujaung Pandang were opened on the basis of Presidential Decree 
No.97 of 1999.32 With the exception of the small jurisdiction of the Commercial 
Court in Semarang, which is only responsible for Central Java and the Special 
Administrative Region of Yogyakarta, the courts have an extended jurisdiction 
over several provinces on various islands of the Indonesian archipelago.33
Appointments to the Commercial Courts are made by the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court. To be appointed, judges must be experienced within the general 
courts, they must possess special knowledge and dedication in the field of 
commercial law must be authoritative, honest, just and well mannered and must 
have followed a special training program for commercial court judges. There is 
also a provision for the appointment of experts as ad hoc non-career judges. If no 
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specialised provisions apply, the general procedural law remains applicable in 
the Commercial Court. Appeal to the Supreme Court and special review 
(peninjauan kembali) remain possible. In the latter case, the Supreme Court is 
given only one month to decide if it concerns an error by the previous courts and 
three months if there is new evidence.
Importantly, Article 280(2) of the Revised Bankruptcy Act foresaw from the 
beginning the possibility to extend the jurisdiction of the Commercial Courts to 
commercial matters other than bankruptcy. At the time, it was envisaged that a 
further Government Regulation would enumerate these additional areas of 
responsibility. The opportunity for extending the responsibility of the 
Commercial Courts arose with the revision of the intellectual property legislation 
between 2000 and 2002. This revision was undertaken to meet the deadlines of 
the WTO Agreement on trade related aspects of intellectual property rights 
(TRIPS), which is an essential component of the Agreement founding the WTO. 
The Indonesian intellectual property reform between 2000 and 2002 was 
designed to bring the Indonesian legislation into line with the standards 
prescribed by TRIPS by completely revising the copyright, patent and trade mark 
legislation and by introducing with trade secrets, industrial designs, designs of 
circuit layouts and plant varieties four new fields of intellectual property 
protection.34
However, not all of these fields have been brought under the umbrella of the new 
specialized Court. Only the core areas of copyright, patents, trade marks, 
industrial designs and designs of circuit layouts are now under the Commercial 
Court, whereas plant varieties, trade secrets and also border control measures 
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Kluwer Law International, 2003, pp. 391-428
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against the import of intellectual property infringing material remain the 
responsibility of the general courts. 
For those areas of intellectual property that from now on fell under the 
responsibility of the Commercial Court, the Government not only prescribed the 
court’s responsibility, but it also took the unusual step of adding procedural 
chapters to the various intellectual property acts. These specialized procedural 
provisions addressed various matters of specific concern in intellectual property 
cases, such as a reversal of the burden of proof in cases of patent violation claims 
involving process patents and the introduction of injunctive relief (penetapan 
sementara). Injunctions such as Anton Piller orders or Mareva injunctions play an 
extremely important role in intellectual property cases, in particular in the 
Anglo-American jurisdictions, because of the ease with which evidence can be 
destroyed or assets can be removed. As was outlined above, in Indonesia 
provisional judgments (putusan provisional) perhaps came closest to injunctive
relief, but their use was extremely restricted under Supreme Court policies. New 
procedural provisions in the intellectual property legislation thus filled this void 
and provided for injunctions both during ongoing proceedings and ex parte.35
A further feature of the procedural provisions in the intellectual property laws 
are tight deadlines for the submission of claims and appeals, but also for the 
courts in setting the dates for court sessions, in coming to a decision and in 
informing the parties of the outcome of the case. These tight deadlines are 
provided not only for the first instance at the Commercial Court, but also for 
appeals to the Supreme Court. The deadlines for the Commercial Court are 
somewhat similar.  For the most common claims of cancellation of a wrongful 
registration and for claims for damages, they foresee that the courts sets the date 
for a first session within 60 days and takes a decision within 90 days. The latter 
deadline may be extended by a further 30 days, if the Chief Justice of the 
                                                
35 Antons, ‘Specialised Intellectual Property Courts in Southeast Asia’, p. 294
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Supreme Court agrees. Appeals to the Supreme Court have to be decided within 
90 days.
Among the procedural changes introduced by the new Bankruptcy Act in 2004 
amended version was the possibility for judges to file dissenting opinions. 
However, this applied for bankruptcy cases only. There is no indication as to 
how the specialized procedural rules in the various intellectual property laws 
relates to the general provisions about the Commercial Court in the new 
Bankruptcy Act. The various pieces of legislation do not make reference to each 
other. Article 299 of the new Bankruptcy Act says merely that general civil 
procedural law applies, unless there something different is stated in the 
provisions of the new bankruptcy legislation. However, since the Bankruptcy Act 
regulates the structure of the courts, the appointment of judges and the process 
of appeal, it must be assumed that the procedural rules in the new intellectual 
property legislation become lex specialis in comparison to the more general rules 
on the Commercial Court in the Bankruptcy Act. Further, since the Bankruptcy 
Act refers itself to the general provisions of the Indonesian procedural law (the 
Herziene Indonesisch Reglement and the Rechtsreglement Buitengewesten), the 
plaintiff in an intellectual property case must in fact be aware of an amalgam of 
procedural provisions, starting from the more specialized ones in the intellectual 
property laws for matters such as injunctions and deadlines, via the less 
specialized ones of the Bankruptcy Act for matters such as composition of the 
courts to the general procedural provisions of the HIR and the Rbg. for issues 
such as evidence taking or the formalities of the submission of the claim. In spite 
of the definite progress brought by the various new procedural provisions for the 
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Commercial Court, the wide spread of the provisions over various pieces of 
legislation thus means that the picture often remains quite confusing.36
How has the new Commercial Court performed? Again, the picture is mixed and 
there is a striking contrast between strong criticism of the court’s decisions in 
bankruptcy cases and its relatively good performance in intellectual property law 
cases. Soon after its establishment, international observers began to criticise the 
court  for wrong or inappropriate decisions in bankruptcy cases.37 Some of the 
criticism was directed directly against the Commercial Court, whereas in other 
cases it was the Supreme Court that was in the firing line for its appeal decisions. 
Perhaps the most notorious case became the bankruptcy declaration of highly 
profitable Canadian life insurance company Manulife in 2002.38 In 2004, the IMF 
evaluated the performance of the court as follows: 
“Although the Court’s image remains poor, studies have found that up to 
70 percent of its decisions are in fact based on sound or defensible legal 
reasoning. It is the remaining 30 percent or so of, usually, high profile 
controversial decisions that continue to tarnish the Court’s reputation. Many 
observers believe these decisions could only have been reached as a result of 
external influences. Moreover, observers also note that much of the Court’s 
perception problems originate from the Supreme Court, where some cases 
properly-decided at the Commercial Court have been wrongly-decided on 
appeal.”39
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In 2003, the World Bank had also concluded that “the principal problem appears 
to be more in the area of enforcement, which goes beyond the capacity of the 
courts.”40 The IMF Report of 2004 included a number of recommendation for the 
long-term institutional reform of the judiciary to address issues such as 
personnel and financial management. Many of these improvements were to come 
from the Judicial Commission, which was just about to be formed.
In comparison to its bankruptcy decisions and judging from the first five 
volumes of decided cases, mainly in the field of trade marks, the intellectual 
property decisions of the Commercial Court have been much less controversial 
and largely sound.41 Occasionally, longstanding problems with how to define 
well-known trade marks have re-emerged42 and the courts have been criticized 
because of this.43 Overall, however, practitioners in Indonesia are reasonably 
content with the decision of the Commercial Court in trade mark cases. 
Especially the speed with which the decisions are made, has improved 
considerably. Of the cases decided in 2002 and 2003 by the Central Jakarta 
Commercial Court, only one case exceeded the maximum period allowed for 
decisions in trade mark cases of four months after the granting of an extension. 
In fact, many cases were decided in less than two months. The greater 
specialization means that a limited number of judges have been allowed to gain 
experience and to continuously work with intellectual property cases. Regular 
publication of Central Jakarta Commercial Court decisions by a commercial 
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41 Antons, ‘Specialised Intellectual Property Courts in Southeast Asia’; Antons and Priapantja.
42 Antons, ‘The Protection of Well-known Marks in Indonesia’, in: Heath and Liu (eds.), The 
Protection of Well-known Marks in Asia, London: Kluwer Law International, 2000, pp. 199-213
43 Mapes, ‘Battle to Reclaim a Brand’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 May 2003; Suryomurcito, 
‘Intellectual property laws still weak’, The Jakarta Post, 31 January 2005
22
publisher to allow for public scrutiny is a further positive development.44 Among 
the challenges to the new court structure are to retain this specialization by 
improving the prospects for promotion of Commercial Court judges and by 
allowing for leapfrog promotions to equally specialized branches of the Supreme 
Court, which are in the process of being created. However, all in all and in spite 
of the criticisms and still existing problems, the creation of specialized courts in 
Indonesia has been an important step forward and it confirms the 
appropriateness of the recommendations in this regard, which were made in the 
various Doing Business Reports from 2004 to 2006.  
The legal heritage theory in the Doing Business Report from the viewpoint of 
comparative law
In the Doing Business Report of 2004, the colonial heritage of legislation was 
discussed. Lighter regulation was found in particular in common law and Nordic 
countries and associated with better economic outcomes. Heavy regulation, on 
the other hand, was linked to the French or socialist legal tradition and 
associated with less efficient economic performance. Interestingly, it was also 
associated with less democracy and with “tropical climates”.45 Also among the 
positive performers are with Japan and Korea two countries regarded as 
belonging to the German tradition and with the Netherlands a single country 
that is classified as belonging to the French tradition.
This part of the report suffers from a lack of understanding of the history of 
European derived laws in colonial settings and from the rather crude 
classification of the various countries as belonging exclusively to the English, 
French, German, Nordic or Socialist systems respectively. It is indeed common in 
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comparative law to classify countries as belonging to ‘legal families’, a 
methodology that, as even the leading comparative text of Zweigert and Kötz46
admits, is ultimately unsatisfactory and subjective and “vulnerable to alteration 
by historical development and change.” The distinctions used in the Doing 
Business report are largely those of Arminjon, Nolde and Wolff, but with the 
additional category of the socialist systems introduced by René David47. In Asia, 
socialist China and the East Asian countries of Japan and Korea are noted as 
having a German legal tradition, all of mainly Southeast Asia with the exception 
of Thailand and Malaysia is French, as are Indonesia and the Philippines.48
The problem with such classifications is that they regard developing countries in 
Asia, Africa and Latin America largely as passive recipients of European laws, 
whose systems are somehow frozen in time and they largely ignore legally 
pluralist settings and the influence of non-European laws.49 Some attempts are 
made at including Chinese and Japanese law (in Zweigert and Kötz under a 
heading “Law in the Far East”) as well as Islamic and Hindu Law (as “Religious 
Legal Systems”). The research of non-European systems less widespread or 
perceived as less important than these is largely left to legal anthropologists.
As a result, the complicated negotiation process about national legal systems that 
is going on in many developing countries is ignored. The Doing Business Report 
2004 is correct in finding that many laws in developing countries still date back 
to colonial times and that in many areas of law, not much reform has taken 
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place.50 However, this overlooks the more complicated history of post-colonial 
legislation. After all, the law introduced by colonial powers in developing 
countries was rarely identical with the increasingly sophisticated law in the 
countries from which it originated and it did not benefit from emerging ideas of 
the rule of law and democracy there.51 The colony of the Dutch East Indies for 
example allowed at no stage real representative government, different laws were 
applied to different groups of the population and rule by executive decree and in 
an ad hoc fashion was fairly common. This tendency to rule by executive decree 
has been difficult to overcome in independent Indonesia. The efforts to find 
compromises on the national law are further complicated by the fact that in 
many cases, different parts of the population see their interests best served by 
different parts of the pluralist legal order.52
However, even if non-Western components of a developing country’s legal 
system are ignored, the adoption of European derived laws is not or no longer 
solely a result of colonization. First of all, the Doing Business Report 2004 is 
wrong in finding that “Thailand is the only East Asian country never to have be 
colonized.”53 Japan of course also prevented colonization by the Western powers 
by opening up the country to trade and by concluding what became known in 
Japan as the “unequal treaties” in 1854 providing for extraterritoriality of citizens 
of Western powers and a separate consular jurisdiction for them.54 As is well-
known, the Japanese embarked on a process to “gather the strong points of the 
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five worlds and construct the great learning of our imperial nation”.55 In the field 
of law, reform took place in a process that John Owen Haley has referred to as 
“selective adaptation”, which actually in many ways was also a continuation of 
the earlier wave of reception of Chinese law in the 7th and 8th century.56 For 
“selective adaptation”, the country drew on various sources, with a particular 
strong German influence in Civil and Commercial Law and Procedural Law, but 
using among others Anglo-American and local Japanese concepts for areas such 
as trusts and family law. Anglo-American influence became stronger after World 
War in constitutional law and in various fields of business law.57 Thus, to 
conclude that Japanese law is derived from German law appears as a 
simplification.
The same would be true for other countries that have adopted Japanese law 
because of colonization by the Japanese, as Korea and Taiwan, or voluntarily, as 
Thailand, which is classified in the Doing Business Report as an English derived 
system in spite of the fact that parts of its legislation are translations from 
Japanese models and French influence has been fairly strong as well in legislation 
as well as in legal education.58 However, the previous European colonies in Asia 
have also not been standing still since decolonisation. Some in fact, such as Sri 
Lanka and the Philippines, had received various legal traditions during the 
colonization process and the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China are 
referred to in Zweigert and Kötz as ‘hybrid’ systems of law.59 To a certain extent 
of course, most systems will be hybrid, if examined more closely. However, the 
process of selectively adapting law from many different sources has been 
particularly strong in parts of the post-independence developing world, where 
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European institutions had been forcefully introduced, had little local tradition 
and where governments felt as a consequence few cultural or historical 
inhibitions to borrow from various traditions.60 Thus, aspects of Anglo-American 
law have been particularly strong in various fields of commercial law and in 
procedural law in countries classified in the report as being in the civil law 
tradition such as Indonesia, Thailand or Vietnam.61
Conclusion
If East and Southeast Asian legal systems are thus essentially hybrid rather than 
clearly French or English or German derived, the negative judgment about 
French derived systems and the positive connotations associated with the other 
systems appears in a different light and may have to be corrected, depending on 
what part of the commercial law system is examined and what legal tradition is 
attributed to it. It is clear from the above and from the Indonesian example that 
many developing countries have been active in transforming their systems in an 
ad hoc manner, although much of this may have happened in the form of 
executive decrees and via judicial activism of the courts. Thus, it may not have 
attracted as much attention as if new comprehensive legislation had been passed. 
It is equally clear that law reform has often been constrained by politics, as is 
correctly stated in the Doing Business Report 2004.62 A lack of democracy 
mentioned in the report, indeed seems to be one of the reasons for the intense 
politicization of law. Other reasons are the importance of industrial policies in 
developing and newly industrializing nations and the continuing negotiations 
about legal unification as an ideal in view of widespread and persistent legal 
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pluralism in reality. Legally pluralist settings offer citizens a choice of forum for 
their disputes. Unless the state courts and national legal systems finally begin to 
deliver on their promises of effective and easily accessible justice, people may 
continue to seek it elsewhere. 
In spite of some of the methodological weaknesses identified above in particular 
with regards to comparative law, the Doing Business Reports correctly identify 
many of the constraints that lawyers and businesses are facing in contract and 
commercial law enforcement. The discussion in this paper has covered not only 
contracts but also intellectual property law and enforcement. For the field of 
intellectual property law, the emphasis of the Doing Business Reports on 
specialized courts has been found to be a step in the right direction, even if the 
results are still sometimes mixed and more time is needed for the reforms to 
make intellectual property enforcement much more effective. The absence of the 
issue of intellectual property protection from the Reports is surprising. After all, 
intellectual property protection via the TRIPS Agreement is an essential part of 
the WTO Agreement. Currently, intellectual property chapters in bilateral Free 
Trade Agreements are among the most hotly debated parts of such agreements. 
Economists regularly point to the importance of intellectual property protection 
for investment decisions based on statistics for some industries (notably 
chemicals), where, depending on the country involved, between 31% and 81% of 
firms regard intellectual property protection as too weak to proceed with the 
investment.63 In view of this importance of intellectual property in the global 
economy, a discussion of intellectual property protection should be included in 
future reports.
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